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Abstract—There are many virtual payment systems available to 
conduct micropayments. It is essential that the protocols satisfy the 
highest standards of correctness. This paper examines the Netpay 
Protocol [3], provide its formalization as automata model, and prove 
two important correctness properties, namely absence of deadlock 
and validity of an ecoin during the execution of the protocol. This 
paper assumes a cooperative customer and will prove that the 
protocol is executing according to its description. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
YSTEM verification techniques’ are nowadays applied to 
the design of many ICT systems. Correctness is 
particularly important for payments systems, such as Netpay. 
Netpay is a virtual payment protocol for small purchases, 
typically on the internet. With the increase of paid services 
and content on the internet, these online payment system 
promise the ease of using cash. There are alternatives to credit 
card based systems, which cannot be used due to their high 
cost per transaction. Mircopayment systems for online 
payments that have been proposed in recent years are Netpay 
as described in [1],[2] and [3], Millicent [4], Micro-mint [5], 
Payword [5], MiniPay [6], Micro-iKP [7] and POPCORN [8]. 
This paper models the Netpay protocol [1] using automata, 
in particular the syntax of interface automata, which 
distinguishes nicely between inputs and outputs. We will use 
this model to show two essential properties: First, that the 
different components cannot block actions of other 
components indefinitely. This is a fairness type property, 
which ensures that the protocol will progress. Second, we will 
show that electronic money called ecoins, will remain valid 
throughout, i.e. that there exists a chain of trust that links any 
ecoin to a trusted broker, even if, for the sake of anonymity, 
this chain is not stored explicitly by the protocol. The model in 
this paper covers the handling of ecoins, and omits the parts of 
the protocol that are concerned with spend redeeming ecoins. 
For the properties under consideration, it was not necessary to 
include these parts. 
The next section of this paper will introduce automata 
model that we will use for modeling and verification. Section 
III will give an overview of the Netpay protocol, while Section 
IV gives the detailed model. Section V formalizes the 
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properties and will give the invariant proof. Section VI 
concludes the paper with a discussion of future work. 
II.   INTERFACE AUTOMATA 
This paper will use a model based on interface automata to 
model the Netpay protocol. Interface automata are in 
particular suitable because they provide a clean distinction 
between input and output actions.  They are similar to 
input/output automata as defined in [9], however do not 
require that all input actions are always enabled. This paper 
will model the each player in the protocol -broker, vendor and 
customer -as an interface automaton, such that the entire 
system is defined by the composition thereof. 
 
We define interface automaton as a tuple 
ܣ ൌ ሺܵ, ܫ, ܪ, ܱ, ܵ௜௡௜௧, ܴሻ with the following components: 
1. A finite set of states S.  
2. Finite sets of input actions I, hidden or internal 
actions H, and output actions O. Input, hidden and 
output actions are disjoint sets.  
3. A set of initial states ܵ௜௡௜௧, a subset of S.  
4. A transition relation R, a subset of ܵ ൈ ሺ݅݊݌ݑݐ ׫
݋ݑݐ݌ݑݐሻ ൈ ܵ where ሺܫ ׫ ܪ ׫ ܱሻ is the set of actions. 
 
The model distinguishes between input, hidden, and output 
actions. It is assumed that output actions are controlled by the 
system whereas the input actions are controlled by the 
environment. An execution fragment is an alternating finite or 
infinite sequence of states and actions 
ݏ଴, ܽ଴, ݏଵ, … … withሺݏ௜, ܽ௜, ݏ௜ାଵሻ א ܴ. An execution fragment 
starting with a start state ݏ଴ א ݏ௜௡௜௧is known as an execution. 
The final state of a finite execution is identified as reachable 
state.  
Interface automata can only be composed if the input and 
output actions match, this means that the input actions are 
disjoint, and that the output actions are disjoint, and hidden 
actions are disjoint from any action of the other automaton. 
Two interface automata ܣଵ ൌ ሺ ଵܵ, ܫଵ, ܪଵ, ଵܱ, ଵܵ௜௡௜௧, ܴଵሻ and 
ܣଶ ൌ ሺܵଶ, ܫଶ, ܪଶ, ܱଶ, ܵଶ௜௡௜௧, ܴଶሻ are said to be composable if 
ܫଵ ת ܫଶ ൌ ׎, ଵܱ ת ܱଶ ൌ ׎, ܪଵ ת ሺܫଶ ׫ ܪଶ ׫ ܱଶሻ ൌ ׎, and 
ሺܫଵ ׫ ܪଵ ׫ ଵܱሻ ת ܪଶ ൌ ׎. The set of shared input/output 
actions ݏ݄ܽݎ݁݀ሺܣଵ, ܣଶሻis defined as ሺܫଵ ת ܱଶሻ ׫ ሺ ଵܱ ת ܫଶሻ. If 
two interface automata ܣଵand ܣଶ are composable their 
composition is defined as a interface automaton ܣᇱ ൌ
ሺܵᇱ, ܫᇱ, ܪᇱ, ܱᇱ, ܵ௜௡௜௧
ᇲ
, ܴᇱሻ with  
• ܵᇱ ൌ ܵଵ ൈ  ܵଶ. 
• ܫᇱ ൌ ሺܫଵ ׫  ܫଶሻ\ݏ݄ܽݎ݁݀ሺܣଵ, ܣଶሻ. 
• ܫᇱ ൌ ሺ ଵܱ ׫  ܱଶሻ\ݏ݄ܽݎ݁݀ሺܣଵ, ܣଶሻ. 
• ܪᇱ ൌ ܪଵ ׫  ܪଶ  ׫ ݏ݄ܽݎ݁݀ሺܣଵ, ܣଶሻ. 
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• ܵ௜௡௜௧ᇲ ൌ ܵଵ௜௡௜௧ ൈ ܵଶ௜௡௜௧. 
• ܴᇱ ൌ
൜൫ሺݒ, ݑሻ, ܽ, ሺݒᇱ, ݑሻ൯ฬ
ܽ ב  ݏ݄ܽݎ݁݀ሺܣଵ, ܣଶሻ  ר
ሺݒ, ܽ, ݒᇱሻ א ܴଵ
ൠ ׫
൜൫ሺݒ, ݑሻ, ܽ, ሺݒ, ݑᇱሻ൯ฬ
ܽ ב  ݏ݄ܽݎ݁݀ሺܣଵ, ܣଶሻ  ר
ሺݑ, ܽ, ݑᇱሻ א ܴଶ
ൠ ׫
ሼሺሺݒᇱ, ݑሻ, ܽ, ሺݒᇱ, ݑᇱሻሻ|ܽ א ݏ݄ܽݎ݁݀ሺܣଵ, ܣଶሻ  ר
ሺݒ, ܽ, ݒᇱሻ א ܴଵ ר ሺݑ, ܽ, ݑᇱሻ א ܴଶሽ 
 
This means that if an input and output action is shared they 
will have to synchronize. This means also that an output action 
might be blocked in a state, if there is no corresponding 
outgoing input action. Input/output automata resolve this issue 
by requiring all input actions to be enabled in all states. 
Interface automata in contrast have the notion of an error state.  
An error state is a state in which one component of the 
compositions has an outgoing output action, while the other 
component does not have the matching input action.  
The model presented departs from interface automata in one 
important aspect, namely that we do accept error states, rather 
than remove them from the set of states. We alternatively 
adopt a notion of (weak) fairness for output actions. Weak 
fairness means that an action cannot be continuously enabled 
and not be taken. In the context of interface automata we 
require a modified notion. We require that an output action 
cannot be continuously enabled, while the corresponding input 
action is continuously disabled. This means that an output 
action might be temporarily blocked, but not indefinitely. This 
is a property that needs to be proven for the Netpay model.  
The model of the Netpay protocol will use a precondition 
effect style of specification, with variables, and parameterized 
actions. The state of an automaton is defined by the values 
assigned to all variables. Preconditions are used to define sets 
of states in which actions with a common label are enabled 
while the effect is used to define the successor states. The 
precondition are omitted is true. Transitions can synchronize if 
they have the same parameterized action label this means the 
state change in both automata will take place as a single 
atomic step. 
III. THE NETPAY PROTOCOL 
This section describes the Netpay protocol for micro- 
payments proposed by Dai [2]. The general structure of the 
Netpay protocol is depicted in Figure 1. The Netpay 
micropayment system comprises three different types of 
actors: customers, brokers and vendors. It is assumed that the 
broker is honest and trusted by both customers and vendors. 
The brokers’ key responsibility is to register customers, credit 
the account of vendors and debit customer account. The 
payments occur between customers and vendors.  
A key idea of Netpay is the use of cryptographic hash 
functions such as MD5 or SHA2. The description of Netpay 
refers to a number of micropayment and cryptographic 
terminologies such as:  
• One way hash function. Netpay as proposed by Dai 
[2] uses the MD5 algorithm as one way hash 
function. Electronic coins are generated and verified 
using this hash function.  
• Payword. A payword has a length of 32 digit 
hexadecimal, and is generated with the one-way hash 
function.  
• Payword Chain. A payword chain is a series of 
paywords, generated from the same seed. For 
example, a payword chain of length 10 might 
represent 10 cents.  
• E-wallet. An e-wallet is a database for storing one or 
more payword e-coins.  
• Seed. A randomly selected value used to generate 
payword chains.  
• Touchstone. In addition to the payword chains, 
vendors and broker store the touchstone. The 
touchstone is used to verify the e-coins sent by the 
customer.  
• Index. Vendors also store an index for each payword 
chain, which indicates the current spent amount of 
each payword chain.  
Let ࣭ be a set of seeds, and ࣪ be a set of paywords. A 
payword chain is then a finite series of payword from ࣪כ. 
Given a one way hash function h, a payword chain 
଴ܹ, … … , ௡ܹ is created from a seed ௡ܹାଵ by applying the hash 
function n + 1 times to the seed. This means ௜ܹ ൌ ݄ሺ ூܹାଵሻ, 
for i = 0,…., n. The touchstone is kept separately, to verify the 
payword chain. Given the touchstone, a payword chain 
ଵܹ, … , ௠ܹcan be verified by applying the hash function to the 
elements of the payword chain, and check that it is indeed a 
chain, and that the hash of the first element is equal to the 
touchtone. 
We define the following two functions to be used by the 
model. First a function createPW:࣭ ൈ ࣨ ՜ ࣪ ൈ ࣪כ, which 
returns for a given seed s and an amount n a triplet of the 
touchstone, a payword chain and the seed. 
ܿݎ݁ܽݐܹ݁ܲሺݏ, ݊ሻ ؜ ቀ݄ሺ௡ାଵሻሺݏሻ, ሺ݄௡ሺݏሻ, … , ݄ଵሺݏሻቁ , ݏሻ 
where ݄௜ሺݏሻ is the i-th application of the hash function to a 
seed value. Then a function verifyPW:࣪ ൈ ࣪כ ՜ ९ which 
returns for a touchstone ଴ܹand a series of paywords 
ሺ ଵܹ, … , ௡ܹሻ the Boolean value true if it is a legitimate 
payword chain: 
ݒ݁ݎ݂݅ݕܹܲሺ ଴ܹሺ ଵܹ, … , ௡ܹሻሻ ؜ ሥ ௜ܹିଵ ൌ ݄ሺ ௜ܹሻ
௜ୀଵ,…,௡
 
The protocol contains four basic types on transactions: 
Customer-Broker, Customer-Vendor, Vendor-Vendor and 
Vendor-Broker transactions. These are illustrated in Figure 1. 
We assume that every customer has a unique ID from a set ࣝ, 
while every broker or vendor has a unique ID from the set ࣰ. 
Note, that vendors and broker share the same ID space. Every 
newly created payword chain will be associated with a unique 
e-coin ID from the set ࣟ. An e-coin is defined as triplet 
ሺ݁݅݀, ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ݒ݅݀ሻof an e-coin ID ݁݅݀ א ࣟ, a payword chain 
݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ א ࣪כ, and a vendor/broker ID ݒ݅݀ א ࣰ. The latter 
denotes which vendor or broker holds the touchstone.  




Fig. 1 A representation of Netpay protocol 
 
The four types of transaction can be characterized as 
follows:  
A. Customer-Broker Transaction 
The customer initiates the transaction in the Netpay 
protocol by registering and sending an integer nto a broker, 
where nis the amount of paywords requested. The Broker 
generates the payword chain of length ݊ and assigns to that 
chain a unique e-coin ID, which together with the broker ID 
will constitute a new e-coin. The broker encrypts the e-coin 
with the customer’s public key (M2, Figure 1) and sends it to 
the customer. The customer decrypts it and stores in its e-
wallet. 
B.   Customer-Vendor Transaction  
The vendor sends the cost and its ID (which is the host/port 
number) to the customer when the customer wishes to buy 
goods. The customer compares the ID with the vendor ID of 
the e-coins in its e-wallet. If there is an e-coin with a matching 
vendor ID and the length of the payword chain is greater than 
the cost, the customer sends the e-coin (M4). If there is no e-
coin with a matching vendor ID, the customer sends any e-
coin with a sufficiently long payword chain (M4). Note, that 
the latter is just an optimization, and not require for 
correctness.  
The vendor ID contained in an e-coin refers to the vendor 
where this e-coin chain was spent last, or to the broker who 
generated the e-coin, if the e-coin has not been spent before. 
The vendor verifies e-coins by requesting the touchstone from 
this broker (M5) or vendor (M8). The response from the 
broker or vendor is encrypted by the secret key. If the 
verification is successful, the vendor sends the required 
information to the customer.  
C. Vendor-Vendor Transaction  
This transaction occurs when one vendor requests a 
touchstone and index from another vendor for a particular e-
coin ID (M8 and M9).  
D. Vendor-Broker Transaction  
To redeem spent e-coins the vendor sends the touchstone, 
customer ID, vendor ID, payword chain and payment to the 
broker for each e-coin spent with the vendor. The broker will 
verify each e-coin received from the vendor by performing 
hashes on it and will count the amount of the paywords. The 
broker will credit the corresponding amount to the vendors 
account if all paywords are valid. This paper focuses on the 
spending of e-coins, and omits redemption of e-coins from the 
model.  
The Netpay protocol specifies three kinds of e-wallets, 
depending on whether it is a client-side, server-side or cookie-
based e-wallet. In this paper we will model the protocol for a 
client side e-wallet.  
E. Properties of Netpay Protocol  
The properties of the Netpay micro-payment system are 
defined in [10] as follows:  
• Security: the aim of security is to prevent any party 
from cheating the system. For example, double 
spending of coins and creation of false coins.  
• Anonymity: the customer anonymity should be 
protected. A fundamental property of physical cash is 
that the relationship between customers and their 
purchases is untraceable. Anonymity as provided by 
Netpay can be proven by anonymous simulation 
which is introduced in [11].  
• Robustness: the protocol is tolerant of network 
bottlenecks and broker/authorizer down-time. The 
broker will be only involved in the generation of e-
coins and providing touchstone for the first set of e-
coins. If the broker is down, the protocol should be 
able to operate for customers who would like to 
spend a partially spent payword chain with a vendor.  
This paper will consider two properties that are important 
for customers that use the protocol correctly. The first is that 
any valid e-coin remains valid, even if it is partially spend. In 
particular, the protocol should guarantees that there exists for 
every e-coin a chain of trust back to the broker, even though 
the system does not store this chain explicitly, to protect 
anonymity. The second property is that the protocol does not 
block any participant in the protocol indefinitely.  
IV. DESCRIPTION OF NETPAY PROTOCOL USING IA 
This section gives a detailed description of the Netpay 
protocol as interface automata. We use one automaton each 
for customers, vendors, and brokers. The overall system is 
described by the composition of all the above automata.  
In the following we use the following conventions: 
Constants will be written with capital letters, local variable are 
written with a capital initial letter, and parameters and free 
variables with lower case letters only. Sets will be denoted 
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mostly by calligraphic letters. We assume that sets for IDs and 
paywords have a distinguished "undefined" element.  
A. IA for Customer  
The automaton ܥݑݏݐ݋݉݁ݎሺܥܫܦሻ modeling a customer 
automaton is shown in Table I. Every customer has a unique 
identifier ܥܫܦ, which is a parameter of the automaton. The 
customer will have an e-wallet, which is a partial function 
ܧݓ݈݈ܽ݁ݐ ك ࣟ ൈ ࣪כ ൈ ࣰ, which associates an e-coin ID with a 
payword chain and a vendor/broker ID. The e-wallet is 
initially empty. There are three possible control locations in 
the cus-tomer automaton which are ܫܦܮܧ, ܤܷܻܧܥܱܫܰ and 
ܤܷܻܩܱܱܦܵ. In addition the automaton has local variable 
ܤܸ݅݀ to store the ID of the vendor who received the ecoin, or 
the ID of the broker who was asked to supply an ecoin.  
We will now describe the automaton’s actions. The model 
assumes the customer is already registered and has started 
using the protocol. In order to buy e-coins the customer has an 
output action Sendሺܥܫܦ, ݊, ܾ݅݀ሻ where ܥܫܦ is the customer 
ID and ݊ א Գ the amount requested, and ܾ݅݀ א ࣰ the ID of the 
broker. The customer automaton will now be in 
ܤܷܻܧܥܱܫܰ state, and the broker ID stored in variable ܤܸ݅݀.  
If the automaton is in location ܤܷܻܧܥܱܫܰ, input action 
SendEcoinሺ݁ܿ݋݅݊, ܥܫܦ, ܤܸ݅݀ሻ models the sending of ݁ܿ݋݅݊ 
from customer ܥܫܦ to broker ܤܸ݅݀. The effect of this input 
action adds the ecoin to the ܧݓ݈݈ܽ݁ݐ and changes the status 
from ܤܷܻܧܥܱܫܰ to ܫܦܮܧ.  
Buying goods from a vendor is also done in two steps. The 
first is modeled by action 
SendPaywordsሺܥܫܦ, ݊݁ݓܿ݋݅݊, ݒ݅݀ሻ. The precondition is that 
the customer has an ecoin in the ewallet. The length or size of 
an ecoin |݁ܿ݋݅݊|is defined as the length of the payword chain. 
The parameter ݊݁ݓܿ݋݅݊ is a new ecoin, which includes the 




























This new ecoin is computed by the function 
݄ܿܽݎ݃݁ሺ݁ܿ݋݅݊, ݊ሻ which maps an e-coin 
ሺ݁݅݀, ሺܹ1, . . . , ܹ݉ሻ, ݒ݅݀ሻ to ሺ݁݅݀, ሺܹ1, . . . , ܹ݊ሻ, ݒ݅݀) if ݊ ൑ ݉. 
The amount ݊ is chosen in this model non-deterministically; 
we omitted the part of the protocols that checks if the funds 
are sufficient from the protocol. In the context of this paper we 
are interested only if the ecoin remains valid.  
The effect of this action is that we change to status 
ܤܷܻܩܱܱܦܵ, store the vendor ID in ܤܸ݅݀, and store the ecoin 
selected from the ewallet in ݋݈݀݁ܿ݋݅݊, and the new ecoin, i.e. 
the remaining paywords that were not sent to the vendor, in 
ܰ݁ݓܿ݋݅݊. The function ݎ݁݉ܽ݅݊݀݁ݎሺ݁ܿ݋݅݊, ݊, ݒ݅݀ሻ is defined 
to map ሺ݁݅݀, ሺܹ1, . . . , ܹ݉ሻ, ݒ݅݀ሻ to 
ሺ݁݅݀, ሺܹ݊ ൅ 1, . . . , ܹ݉ሻ, ݒ݅݀ሻ if ݊ ൑ ݉.  
In status ܤܷܻܩܱܱܦܵ the customer waits for confirmation. 
The reply from the vendor is modeled by input action 
SendInformationBoughtሺܥܫܦ, ܤݒ݅݀ሻ. It is enabled if the 
parameter ݒ݅݀, which will be the replying vendor ID, is equal 
ܥݑݏݐ݋݉݁ݎሺܥܫܦሻ 
ܧݓ݈݈ܽ݁ݐ ك ࣟ ൈ ࣪כ ൈ ࣰ, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ ׎ 
ܵݐܽݐݑݏ א ሼܫܦܮܧ, ܤܷܻܧܥܱܫܰ, ܤܷܻܩܱܱܦܵሽ, 
݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ ܫܦܮܧ 
ܤܸ݅݀ א ࣰ, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ ݑ݂݊݀݁݅݊݁݀ 
ܰ݁ݓ݁ܿ݋݅݊ א ࣟ ൈ ࣪כ ൈ ࣰ, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ ݑ݂݊݀݁݅݊݁݀ 
ܱ݈݀݁ܿ݋݅݊ א ࣟ ൈ ࣪כ ൈ ࣰ, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ ݑ݂݊݀݁݅݊݁݀ 
                 ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ  ܫܦܮܧ 
             ܤܸ݅݀Ԣ ൌ  ܾ݅݀ 
׌݁ܿ݋݅݊ א ܧݓ݈݈ܽ݁ݐ, ݊
൑ |݁ܿ݋݅݊|ݏ. ݐ. ݊݁ݓ݁ܿ݋݅݊
ൌ ݄ܿܽݎ݃݁ሺ݁ܿ݋݅݊, ݊ሻ 
                 ܤܸ݅݀Ԣ ൌ ݒ݅݀ 
ܱ݈݀݁ܿ݋݅݊Ԣ ൌ ݁ܿ݋݅݊ 
ܰ݁ݓ݁ܿ݋݅݊Ԣ ൌ ݎ݁݉ܽ݅݊݀݁ݎሺ݁ܿ݋݅݊, ݊, ݒ݅݀ሻ
State:  
Input Actions:  
SendEcoinሺ݁ܿ݋݅݊, ܥܫܦ, ܤܸ݅݀ሻ 
Pre: ܵݐܽݐݑݏ ൌ ܤܷܻܧܥܱܫܰ 
Effect: ܧݓ݈݈ܽ݁ݐԢ ൌ ܧݓ݈݈ܽ݁ݐ ׫ ݁ܿ݋݅݊ 
SendInformationBoughtሺܥܫܦ, ܤܸ݅݀ሻ 
Pre: ܵݐܽݐݑݏ ൌ ܤܷܻܩܱܱܦܵ 
Effect: ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ  ܫܦܮܧ 
             ܧݓ݈݈ܽ݁ݐԢ ൌ ሺܧݓ݈݈ܽ݁ݐ\ሼܱ݈݀݁ܿ݋݅݊ሽሻ ׫
ሼܰ݁ݓ݁ܿ݋݅݊ሽ   
Output Actions:  
Sendሺܥܫܦ, ݊, ܾ݅݀ሻ 
Pre: ܵݐܽݐݑݏ ൌ ܫܦܮܧ 
Effect: ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ  ܤܷܻܧܥܱܫܰ 
 
SendPaywordsሺܥܫܦ, ݊݁ݓܿ݋݅݊, ݒ݅݀ሻ 
Pre: ܵݐܽݐݑݏ ൌ ܫܦܮܧ 
Effect:  ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ ܤܷܻܩܱܱܦܵ 
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to the stored ID, the vendor the e-coin was sent to. It will 
replace the old ecoin in the ewallet with the new ecoin.  
B. IA for Brokers  
The behavior of the broker will be modeled by an 
automaton ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎሺܤܫܦሻ. The broker ID ܤܫܦ is from the 
same set ࣰ as the vendor IDs. This is because to vendors a 










The broker keeps information on generated e-coins in a 
database ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎܦܤ ك ࣟ ൈ ࣪. An entry ሺ݁݅݀, ܿ݅݀, ݐݏ, ݏ, ݊ሻ 
captures the e-coin ID ݁݅݀, the customer ID ܿ݅݀, the 
touchstone ݐݏ, the seed ݏ, and the amount ݊. Other local 
variables are ܧ݅݀, ܥ݅݀, ܵ݁݁݀, ܶݏݐ݋݊݁, ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, and ܤܸ݅݀, 
which are used to store intermediate results, when generating 
an ecoin, or replying to a request to send the touchstone for an 
ecoin.  
The broker automaton models two possible exchanges of 
messages; the first when a customer requests a new ecoin, and 
the second when a vendor asks to get the touchstone that 
belongs to a given ecoin.  
The first action of the broker automaton models a request to 
generate e-coins. Input action Sendሺܿ݅݀, ݊, ܤܫܦሻ has a 
parameter ܿ݅݀, the ID of the requesting customer, ݊ the 
amount requested, and the ID of the broker itself. The input  
action is enabled when the status is ܫܦܮܧ, and it will change 
to ܩܧܰܧܴܣܶܧܧܥܱܫܰ. This action will also store the ID of 
the requesting customer in ܥ݅݀. Finally it will compute a new 
ecoin ID, and a triplet of a touchstone, payword chain and a 
seed. The function ݊݁ݓselects a new value from either ࣭or ࣟ, 
i.e. it will select a new seed and ecoin ID. This input action 
will be followed by the output action 
SendEcoinሺሺܧ݅݀, ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ܤܫܦሻ, ܥ݅݀, ܤܫܦሻ. It models the 
sending of a new ecoin, with ID ܧ݅݀, payword chain ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ 
and vendor/broker ID ܤܫܦ to customer ܥ݅݀. This action is 
enabled if the status is ܩܧܰܧܴܣܶܧܧܥܱܫܰ. The status will 
change to ܫܦܮܧ and the necessary information on the ecoin 
will be stored in the broker database ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎܦܤ.  
The request by a vendor for a touchstone is modeled by 
input action GetTouchStoneሺ݁݅݀, ݒ݅݀, ܤܫܦሻ. It has as 
parameters the ID ݁݅݀ of the ecoin that needs to be verified, 
the ID ݒ݅݀ of the vendor making the request, and ID of the 
broker itself. This action is enabled if the status is ܫܦܮܧ and if 
an ecoin with ID ݁݅݀ exists in the broker database ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎܦܤ. 
This action will change the status to ܹܣܫܶ, and store the 
ecoin ID ݁݅݀ and the touchstone ݐݏ from the broker database, 
and also store the ID of the requesting vendor ݒ݅݀.  
The reply to the touchstone request is modeled by output 
action SendTouchStoneሺܧ݅݀, 1, ܶݏݐ݋݊݁, ܤܫܦ, ܤܸ݅݀ሻ, which 
models sending the ecoin ID ܧ݅݀, the index 1, the touchstone 
ܶݏݐ݋݊݁, from the broker ܤܫܦ to the vendor ܤܸ݅݀. The index 
has constant value 1, because this reply is sent by the broker, 
when the ecoin is still fresh. The action is enabled if the status 
is ܹܣܫܶ, and it change the status to ܫܦܮܧ.  
C. IA for Vendor  
The automaton ܸ݁݊݀݋ݎሺܸܫܦሻ modeling a vendor 
automaton is shown in Table III and Table IV. Since there will 
be many vendors, we use the vendor ID ܸܫܦ. Each vendor will 
maintain a vendor database ܸ݁݊݀݋ݎܦܤ ك Ԫ ൈ ࣪, a partial 
function from a ecoin ID to a touchstone. Recall that the 
touchstone of an ecoin with ݊ paywords, is obtained by 






ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎܦܤ ك ࣟ ൈ ࣪, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ ׎  
ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ  א ࣪כ, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ ݁݉݌ݐݕ 
ܤܸ݅݀        א ࣰ, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ ݑ݊݀݁fi݊݁݀  
              ܥ݅݀Ԣ ൌ ܿ݅݀ 
              ܧ݅݀Ԣ ൌ ݊݁ݓሺࣟሻሺܶݏݐ݋݊݁Ԣ, ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏԢ, ܵ݁݁݀Ԣሻ ൌ 
              ܿݎ݁ܽݐܹ݁ܲሺ݊, ݊݁ݓሺ࣭ሻሻ 
        ሺ׌ሺ݁݅݀, ݐݏሻ א  ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎܦܤሻ 
ܧ݅݀Ԣ ൌ  ݁݅݀ 
ܶݏݐ݋݊Ԣ ൌ  ݐݏ 
ܤܸ݅݀Ԣ ൌ  ݒ݅݀ 
 
             ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎܦܤԢ ൌ ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎܦܤ ׫ ሺܧ݅݀, ܶݏݐ݋݊݁ሻ 
State:  
ܵݐܽݐݑݏ א  ሼܫܦܮܧ, ܹܣܫܶ, ܩܧܰܧܴܣܶܧܧܥܱܫܰሽ,
 ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ ܫܦܮܧ 
ܧ݅݀ א  ࣟ, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ ݑ݊݀݁fi݊݁݀  
ܥ݅݀ א  ࣝ, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ ݑ݊݀݁fi݊݁݀  
ܵ݁݁݀ א  ࣭ ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ ݑ݊݀݁fi݊݁݀  
ܶݏݐ݋݊݁ א  ࣪, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ ݑ݊݀݁fi݊݁݀  
 
Input Actions:  
Sendሺܿ݅݀, ݊, ܤܫܦሻ 
Pre: ܵݐܽݐݑݏ ൌ ܫܦܮܧ 
Effect: ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ  ܩܧܰܧܴܣܶܧܧܥܱܫܰ 
 
GetTouchStoneሺ݁݅݀, ݒ݅݀, ܤܫܦሻ 
Pre: ܵݐܽݐݑݏ ൌ ܫܦܮܧ  
Effect:ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ  ܹܣܫܶ 
Output Actions:  
SendEcoinሺሺܧ݅݀, ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ܤܫܦሻ, ܥ݅݀, ܤܫܦሻ 
Pre: ܵݐܽݐݑݏ ൌ ܩܧܰܧܴܣܶܧܧܥܱܫܰ 
Effect: ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ  ܫܦܮܧ 
SendTouchStoneሺܧ݅݀, 1, ܶݏݐ݋݊݁, ܤܫܦ, ܤܸ݅݀ሻ 
Pre: ܵݐܽݐݑݏ ൌ ܹܣܫܶ 
Effect: ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ  ܫܦܮܧ 








VENDOR AUTOMATON (OUTPUT ACTIONS) 
 
 
The status of the vendor can be either  
ܫܦܮܧ, ܹܣܫܶ, ܵܧܣܴܥܪ, ܸܧܴܫܨܫܥܣܶܫܱܰ or ܸܧܴܫܨܫܧܦ. 
Furthermore the vendor uses local variables 
ܧ݅݀, ܤܸ݅݀, ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ܶݏݐ݋݊݁ and ܥ݅݀ to store information 
about the customers and vendors/broker it communicates with, 
and the ecoins that need to be verified.  
The vendor performs two major tasks: verifying e-coins 
received from customers and providing the touchstone to a 
requesting vendor. Verification of ecoins has to consider two 
cases: that the touchstone for the ecoin is with the vendor, or 
that the touchstone is with another vendor/broker. 
The first task will be initiated upon receipt of the input 
action SendPaywordsሺܿ݅݀, ሺ݁݅݀, ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ݐ݈݋ܿሻ, ܸܫܦሻ. This 
action models the sending of an ecoin 
ሺ݁݅݀, ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ݐ݈݋ܿሻfrom customer ܿ݅݀ to the vendor ܸܫܦ. 
This action is enabled if the status is ܫܦܮܧ.  
If the location of the touchstone ݐ݈݋ܿ is not equal to the 
vendor ID ܸܫܦ it will change its status to ܹܣܫܶand store the 
customer ID ܿ݅݀ and the ecoin ID ݁݅݀, the payword chain 
݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, and the touchstone location ݐ݈݋ܿ. 
If the location of the touchstone ݐ݈݋ܿ is equal to the vendor 
ID ܸܫܦ, it will use the stored touchstone ܸ݁݊݀݋ݎܦܤሺ݁݅݀ሻto 
verify the payword chain. If the payword chain can be 
verified, i.e. ݒ݁ݎ݂݅ݕܹܲሺܸ݁݊݀݋ݎܦܤሺ݁݅݀ሻ, ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሻis true, 
then the status changes to ܸܧܴܫܨܫܧܦ. The effect stores the 
customer ID ܿ݅݀, and the ecoin ID ݁݅݀, the payword chain 
݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, and the touchstone location ݐ݈݋ܿ.  
Recall that the customer sends a prefix of a longer payword 
chain, and that the last payword of that prefix, will be the 
touchstone for the remaining payword chain, which is still 
with the customer. Note, that this differs from the description 
by Dai [2]. In that paper indices in combination with the 
original touchstone are used to mark the last payword that has 
been spent. For the scope of this paper both approaches are 
equal, however adding indices would add complexity.  
If the ecoin cannot be verified by the vendor itself, i.e. if 
ݐ݈݋ܿ! ൌ ܸܫܦ and the status is ܹܣܫܶ, it will request the 
ܸ݁݊݀݋ݎܦܤԢ ൌ ሺܸ݁݊݀݋ݎܦܤ\ሼሺܧ݅݀, ܸ݁݊݀݋ݎܦܤሺܧ݅݀ሻሽሻ
׫ ሼሺܧ݅݀, ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ௟௔௦௧ሻሽ  
Output Actions:  
GetTouchStoneሺܧ݅݀, ܤܸ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ 
Pre: ܵݐܽݐݑݏ ൌ ܹܣܫܶ 
Effect: ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ  ܸܧܴܫܨܫܥܣܶܫܱܰ 
 
SendInformationBoughtሺܿ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ 
Pre: ܵݐܽݐݑݏ ൌ ܸܧܴܫܨܫܧܦ 
Effect: ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ  ܫܦܮܧ 
 
SendTouchStoneሺܧ݅݀, ܶݏݐ݋݊݁, ܤܸ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ 
Pre: ܵݐܽݐݑݏ ൌ ܵܧܣܴܥܪ 
Effect: ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ ܫܦܮܧ 
 
ܸ݁݊݀݋ݎሺܸܫܦሻ 
      ܸ݁݊݀݋ݎܦܤ ك ࣟ ൈ ࣪ 
 ܵݐܽݐݑݏ א ሼܫܦܮܧ, ܹܣܫܶ, ܵܧܣܴܥܪ, ܸܧܴܫܨܫܥܣܶܫܱܰ, 
ܸܧܴܫܨܫܧܦሽ, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕܫܦܮܧ 
ሼ  
ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ  ܹܣܫܶ 
ܥ݅݀Ԣ ൌ  ܿ݅݀ 
ܧ݅݀Ԣ ൌ  ݁݅݀ 
ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏԢ ൌ  ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ 




ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ  ܸܧܴܫܨܫܧܦ 
ܥ݅݀Ԣ ൌ  ܿ݅݀ 
ܧ݅݀Ԣ ൌ  ݁݅݀ 
ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏԢ ൌ  ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ 




ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ  ܫܦܮܧ 
ሽ  
ሼ  




ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ  ܫܦܮܧ 
ሽ 
ሺ׌ሺ݁݅݀, ݐݏሻ א  ܸ݁݊݀݋ݎܦܤሻ 
 ܶݏݐ݋݊݁Ԣ ൌ  ݐݏ 
 ܧ݅݀Ԣ ൌ  ݁݅݀ 
State:  
ܧ݅݀ א  ࣟ, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕݑ݂݊݀݁݅݊݁݀ 
ܤܸ݅݀ א  ࣰ, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ݁݉݌ݐݕ
ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ א  ࣪כ, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ݁݉݌ݐݕ 
ܶݏݐ݋݊݁ א ࣪, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕݑ݂݊݀݁݅݊݁݀ 
ܥ݅݀ א  ࣝ, ݅݊݅ݐ݈݈݅ܽݕ݁݉݌ݐݕ
 
Input Actions:  
SendPaywordsሺܿ݅݀, ሺ݁݅݀, ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ݐ݈݋ܿሻ, ܸܫܦሻ 
Pre: ܵݐܽݐݑݏ ൌ ܫܦܮܧ 
Effect: ݂݅ሺݐ݈݋ܿ! ൌ ܸܫܦሻ 
SendTouchStoneሺ݁݅݀, ݐݏ, ܤܸ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ 
Pre: ܵݐܽݐݑݏ ൌ ܸܧܴܫܨܫܥܣܶܫܱܰ 
Effect: ݂݅ሺݒ݁ݎ݂݅ݕܹܲሺݐݏ, ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሻሻ 
 
GetTouchStoneሺ݁݅݀, ܤܸ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ 
Pre: ܵݐܽݐݑݏ ൌ ܫܦܮܧ 
Effect: ܵݐܽݐݑݏԢ ൌ ܵܧܣܴܥܪ 
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touchstone from the vendor/broker. This means any vendor 
can request a touchstone or reply to such a request.  
First, consider that the vendor requests a touchstone. This 
request is modeled by output action 
GetTouchStoneሺܧ݅݀, ܤܸ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ. The parameters of this 
action are the ecoin ID, the ID of the vendor/broker that has 
the touchstone, and the ID of the vendor itself. The effect is 
that the vendor will change its status to ܸܧܴܫܨܫܥܣܶܫܱܰ. The 
received reply is modeled by input action 
SendTouchStoneሺ݁݅݀, ݐݏ, ܤܸ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ, which will in its effect 
verify the payword chain with respect to the received 
touchstone, and change its status to ܸܧܴܫܨܫܧܦ. If the status is 
ܸܧܴܫܨܫܧܦ a vendor can inform the customer of the success-
ful transaction which is modeled by output action 
SendInformationBoughtሺܿ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ. This action will update 
the vendor database, by removing the touchstone and 
replacing it by the last payword of the stored payword chain. 
A vendor who receives a touchstone request will do the 
following. An incoming request is modeled by input action 
GetTouchStoneሺ݁݅݀, ܤܸ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ, which is similar to the 
input action with the same name for the broker in Table II. 
The response to the request is modeled by output action 
SendTouchStoneሺܧ݅݀, ܶݏݐ݋݊݁, ܤܸ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ, after which the 
vendor is back to status ܫܦܮܧ. This action is also similar to 
output action with the same name for the broker in Table II  
In the next section we will look at the correctness of this 
protocol, assuming a cooperative customer and vendor. In this 
case the protocol should ensure that for every ecoin there 
exists a chain of trust back to the issuing broker. 
V. CORRECTNESS OF NETPAY PROTOCOL  
Given the model of the Netpay protocol in section IV, we 
prove the correctness of this in this section. The assumption is 
that we have cooperative customers and vendors who adhere 
to the protocol. In that case we require that an ecoin remain 
valid, and will be correctly verified as a valid ecoin. We will 
in particular show that for any ecoin there exists a chain of 
touchstones back to the vendors who issued the ecoin. We will 
show existence of such a chain, even though it cannot be 
reconstructed from locally available information.  
Furthermore we want the protocol to be responsive without 
any deadlocks. In particular it should be the case that if an 
output action satisfies the precondition locally, it cannot be 
blocked indefinitely. This is of course based on the premise 
that all executions are fair, i.e. that all participants execute 
their enabled actions eventually.  
A. Chain of Trust  
The correctness proof will rely on invariants, i.e. properties 
that can be shown to hold in every state, regardless of state 
changes. The overall property we prove is that for any ecoin 
there exists vendor with a touchstone ݐݏ, that the ecoin is valid 
with respect to that touchstone, and that there exists a broker 
and a positive integer ݅ such that ݄݅ሺݐݏሻ is the touchstone 
stored by the broker. The proof is broken into three parts:  
1) If a customer receives a new ecoin from a broker, that 
broker will have a corresponding touchstone.  
2) If a customer keeps the remainder of an ecoin after 
payment to a vendor, then that vendor will have a 
corresponding touchstone.  
3) For any touchstone that a vendor keeps, there exists a 
corresponding touchstone at a broker.  
The proof for the overall property follows from this. The 
following will describe each property in detail.  
 
Lemma 1: Let ሺ݁݅݀, ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ܾ݅݀ሻ א ܧݓ݈݈ܽ݁ݐ of a customer 
ܥݑݏݐ݋݉݁ݎሺܥܫܦሻ, and let ܾ݅݀ be the ID of a broker 
ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎሺܾ݅݀ሻ. Then there exists an entry ሺ݁݅݀, ݐݏሻ in the 
database ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎܦܤ of ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎሺܾ݅݀ሻ, such that 
ݒ݁ݎ݂݅ݕܹܲሺݐݏ, ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሻ holds.  
Proof: The claim of Lemma 1 is an invariant, and can be 
proven by induction on the length of execution. The base case 
of induction is to prove that invariant is true in the initial state. 
Initially, ܧݓ݈݈ܽ݁ݐ is empty, hence the invariant is true.  
Next we have to show that the invariant remains true under 
all possible actions. We assume that the invariant is true in a 
predecessor state of an action and show that it will be true in 
the successor state.  
The customer has only two actions that modify the ewallet: 
SendEcoinሺ݁ܿ݋݅݊, ܥܫܦ, ܾ݅݀ሻ and 
SendInformationBoughtሺܥܫܦ, ܤܸ݅݀ሻ.  
• SendEcoinሺ݁ܿ݋݅݊, ܥܫܦ, ܤܸ݅݀ሻ 
This action is enabled if the status is ܤܷܻܧܥܱܫܰ, 
which mean this action was preceded by output 
action Sendሺܥܫܦ, ݊, ܾ݅݀ሻ. Both of these actions 
synchronize with corresponding actions of the broker. 
The combined action Sendሺܥܫܦ, ݊, ܤܫܦሻ will have as 
effect that the broker stored a valid ecoin and its 
touchstone in its local variables 
ܧ݅݀, ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ܶݏݐ݋݊݁, i.e. 
ݒ݁ݎ݂݅ݕܹܲሺܶݏݐ݋݊݁, ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሻ holds by construction. 
This step will be succeeded by a combined action  
SendEcoinሺሺܧ݅݀, ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ܤܫܦሻ, ܥܫܦ, ܤܫܦሻ.  
On the customer side it will store the ecoin 
ሺܧ݅݀, ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ܤܫܦሻ in the ewallet, and on the broker 
side ሺܧ݅݀, ܶݏݐ݋݊݁ሻ in database ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎܦܤ.  
• SendInformationBoughtሺܥܫܦ, ܤܸ݅݀ሻ 
This input action of a customer synchronizes with a 
corresponding vendor action. It is enabled if the 
status is ܤܷܻܩܱܱܦܵ, which means that this action 
was preceded by action 
SendPaywordsሺܥܫܦ, ݊݁ݓܿ݋݅݊, ݒ݅݀ሻ. This action 
created a new ecoin that replaced the broker ID with 
a vendor ID. This means that the assumption of 
Lemma 1, namely that the touchstone location is a 
broker ID, no longer applies, and thus that the 
invariant holds.  
All other actions of the other automata do not change the 
ewallet or broker database, and thus have no effect on the 
invariant of Lemma 1.  
The second invariant shows that if an e-coin is in an ewallet 
and the touchstone location is said to be at a vendor, then the 
vendor has the touchstone.  
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Lemma 2: Let ሺ݁݅݀, ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ݒ݅݀ሻ א ܧݓ݈݈ܽ݁ݐ of a customer 
ܥݑݏݐ݋݉݁ݎሺܥܫܦሻ, and let ݒ݅݀ be the ID of a vendor 
ܸ݁݊݀݋ݎሺݒ݅݀ሻ. Then there exists an entry ሺ݁݅݀, ݐݏሻ in the 
database ܸ݁݊݀݋ݎܦܤ of ܸ݁݊݀݋ݎሺݒ݅݀ሻ, such that 
ݒ݁ݎ݂݅ݕܹܲሺݐݏ, ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሻ holds.  
Proof: This lemma defines as the pervious lemma as an 
invariant. The claim is true in the initial state, as ܧݓ݈݈ܽ݁ݐ is 
initially empty.  
The customer has only two actions that modify the ewallet 
SendEcoinሺ݁ܿ݋݅݊, ܥܫܦ, ܾ݅݀ሻ and 
SendInformationBoughtሺܥܫܦ, ܤܸ݅݀ሻ.  
• SendEcoinሺ݁ܿ݋݅݊, ܥܫܦ, ܾ݅݀ሻ 
This action will add an ecoin ሺ݁݅݀, ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ܾ݅݀ሻ in 
which ܾ݅݀ is a broker ID. Hence, the premise of 
Lemma 2 is false, which makes the invariant true.  
• SendInformationBoughtሺܥܫܦ, ܤܸ݅݀ሻ 
This input action of a customer synchronizes with a 
corresponding vendor action. It is enabled if the 
status is ܤܷܻܩܱܱܦܵ, which means that this action 
was preceded by action 
SendPaywordsሺܥܫܦ, ݊݁ݓܿ݋݅݊, ݒ݅݀ሻ. The effect of 
the combined action 
SendPaywordsሺܥܫܦ, ݊݁ݓܿ݋݅݊, ܸܫܦሻ is that the 
vendor stores the first ݊ paywords in the vendors 
local variable ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, and the remainder in the 
customers variable ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ. For clarification we 
denote the first as ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏܿ and the latter as 
ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ௩.  When customer and vendor successively 
synchronize on action 
SendInformationBoughtሺܥܫܦ, ܸܫܦሻ the vendor 
stores the last payword of ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏݒ
 
chain as 
touchstone in the ܸ݁݊݀݋ݎܦܤ, and all successive 
paywords, ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏܿ
 
, as part of the new ecoin in the 
ewallet of the customer. Since both derive from a 




௩ , ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏܿሻ holds.  
All other actions of the other automata do not change the 
ewallet or vendor database, and thus have no effect on the 
invariant of Lemma 2.  
Lemma 3: Let ሺ݁݅݀, ݐݏሻ א ܸ݁݊݀݋ݎܦܤ of a vendor 
ܸ݁݊݀݋ݎሺܸܫܦሻ, then there exists a broker ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎሺܤܫܦሻ and 
an ݊ א Գ such that for the broker database holds ݄݊ሺݐݏሻ ൌ
ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎܦܤሺ݁݅݀ሻ.  
Proof: This invariant states that a touchstone kept by a vendor 
is a predecessor in the payword chain. The claim is true in the 
initial state, as the vendor database is still empty.  
The only action that changes the vendor database is 
SendInformationBoughtሺܥܫܦ, ܤܸ݅݀ሻ. This action is enabled 
if the status is ܸܧܴܫܨܫܧܦ. There are two possible predecessor 
actions that set the status to ܸܧܴܫܨܫܧܦ. The first is 
SendTouchStoneሺ݁݅݀, ݐݏ, ܤܸ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ, which retrieves a 
touchstone ݐݏ either from another broker or vendor, and this 
touchstone is used in the condition 
݂݅ሺݒ݁ݎ݂݅ݕܹܲሺݐݏ, ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሻሻ. This means that all paywords in 
the payword chain ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ and the received touchstone, 
belong to the same payword chain. If ݐݏ was obtained from a 
broker, the invariant holds trivially, if it was obtained from 
another vendor it holds because by assumption the old 
touchstone was a successor of a broker touchstone in a 
payword chain.  
The other possible predecessor is input action 
SendPaywordsሺܿ݅݀, ሺ݁݅݀, ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ݐ݈݋ܿሻ, ܸܫܦሻ,  
which will check the condition 
݂݅൫ݒ݁ݎ݂݅ݕܹܲሺܸ݁݊݀݋ݎܦܤሺ݁݅݀ሻ, ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሻ൯ if the touchstone 
is in the vendors own database. This means that we can use the 
assumption that the old touchstone was a successor of a broker 
touchstone to show that the new touchstone is so as well.  
 
Theorem 1: Let ሺ݁݅݀, ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ݒ݅݀ሻ א ܧݓ݈݈ܽ݁ݐ of a customer 
ܥݑݏݐ݋݉݁ݎሺܥܫܦሻ, then there exists a broker ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎሺܤܫܦሻ and 
an ݊ א Գ such that for the broker database holds 
݄݊ሺ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏଵሻ ൌ ܤݎ݋݇݁ݎܦܤሺ݁݅݀ሻ, where ݌ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏଵ is the first 
element of the payword chain.  
Proof: This follows from Lemma 1 to 3.  
B. Non-Blocking Behavior  
The automata that model of the Netpay protocol only use 
input and output actions, and no internal hidden action. For 
every action two automata have to synchronize. An action can 
take place if the precondition of the input and output action are 
satisfied. If the precondition of the output action is satisfied, 
but the precondition of the corresponding input action is not, 
then the output action is blocked. This means that one 
automaton can prevent another automaton from producing 
output.  
In the I/O automata framework it is required that all input 
actions are always enabled, i.e. output action can never be 
blocked. In the interface automata framework states in which 
actions are blocked are identified and removed from the 
model. Neither of these two solution seemed appropriate for 
this case; output may be blocked, if for example the other 
automaton is processing another ecoin. This is acceptable as 
long as this output action is not blocked indefinitely. If the 
output action is enabled then at some point in the future the 
corresponding input action should be enabled as well. In the 
context of Netpay this means for example that a broker might 
block a customer for some time, while it processes a different 
ecoin request, but that the broker will eventually return to 
status ܫܦܮܧ, where it accepts the request.  
To prove the non-blocking behavior we have to assume that 
the Netpay automaton model is (weak) fair, namely that if an 
action cannot be enabled indefinitely, i.e. the precondition of 
both input and output action are satisfied, then the action will 
eventually be taken. Given that assumption we can show that 
if an output action is indefinitely enabled, then the 
corresponding input action will be enabled eventually.  
Key to this is the observation that all automata will return to 
the status ܫܦܮܧ. Most communication between two automata 
are models as a pair of actions. These pairs are: 
• Shared actions Sendሺܿ݅݀, ݊, ܤܫܦሻ and 
SendEcoinሺሺܧ݅݀, ܲݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ, ܤܫܦሻ, ܥ݅݀, ܤܫܦሻ; the 
request for an ecoin by a customer, and the reply by a 




• Shared actions GetTouchStoneሺ݁݅݀, ܤܸ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ and 
GetTouchStoneሺܧ݅݀, ܤܸ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ; the request on a 
touchstone from broker/vendor and the reply.  
• Shared actions 
SendPaywordsሺܥܫܦ, ݊݁ݓܿ݋݅݊, ݒ݅݀ሻ and 
SendInformationBoughtሺܥܫܦ, ܤܸ݅݀ሻ; the sending 
of an ecoin to a vendor, and the confirmation.  
For the first two pairs we have that after taking the first 
action, the only action that both participating automata can 
take is the second, and the second action is enabled. This 
means it won’t be blocked and the automata can return 
to  ܫܦܮܧ. The third pair is slightly more involved. If the 
touchstone is held by the vendor, then the only action that is 
possible next is SendInformationBoughtሺܥܫܦ, ܤܸ݅݀ሻ, and 
that action is enabled. If the touchstone is with another vendor 
or broker, it has to execute action 
GetTouchStoneሺ݁݅݀, ܤܸ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ and 
GetTouchStoneሺܧ݅݀, ܤܸ݅݀, ܸܫܦሻ. Since these are not 
blocking, the requesting vendor will reach status 
ܸܧܴܫܨܫܧܦ eventually, which means that 
SendInformationBoughtሺܥܫܦ, ܤܸ݅݀ሻ is enabled. This shows 
that for either of these series of actions, the automata will get 
back to a status that accepts new requests. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this paper, we have modeled and analyzed some 
properties of Netpay protocol using IA. We have verified two 
important properties:  
• There is no deadlock in the model.  
• If the protocol is executing according to its 
specification, the ecoins remains valid.  
The verification done in this paper for ecoin validity is on 
the assumption that the customer and vendor is cooperative. 
We are currently working on verifying whether the ecoins 
remain valid when a customer or vendor is not cooperative. As 
mentioned in the paper, there are different e-wallets for the 
Netpay protocol, we will model and verify Netpay protocol 
with different e-wallets. The work of this paper has not 
addressed anonymity and robustness properties. These are two 
important properties of the Netpay protocol which is part of 
our future work. 
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